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INTRODUCTION
The Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lectureship was founded in 1944
as a memorial to Dr. Henry Wells Lawrence, Chairman of the Department of
History and Government at Connecticut College from 1920 to 1942, by friends,
colleagues, and former students of Dr. Lawrence. The Lectureship brings
scholars in the broad field of history to present their subjects "in the spirit of
the liberal tradition to which Dr. Lawrence was devoted."
The present volume publishes the following Lectures for 1953 1955 and
1957:
Bernhard Knollenberg s Causes and Growth of the American Revolution;
Franklin L. Baumer's Religion and the Sceptical Tradition;
Myron P. Gilmore's Erasmus: The Scholar and the World.
F. EDWARD CRANZ, Editor

Department of History
Connecticut College

CAUSES AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
BY BERNHARD KNOLLENBERG
The American Revolution about which I shall speak tonight is the revolu
tion referred to in the well-known letter of John Adams to Hezekiah Niles in
1818. "The people of America," he wrote, "had been educated in an habitual
affection for England, as their mother country; and while they thought her a
kind and tender parent ... no affection could be more sincere. But when they
found her a cruel beldam . . . their filial affections . . . were changed into in
dignation . . . This radical change in the principle, opinions, sentiments, and
affections of the people, was the real American Revolution."
The change described by Adams developed in two distinct stages: the first,
1759 to 1766, culminated in the colonial uprising of 1765-6 against the Stamp
Act, the other, 1767 to 1775, in the bloody Day of Lexington and Concord.
In speaking of colonial or colonies, I refer, unless otherwise indicated, exclu
sively to the thirteen British colonies on the North American continent that
rebelled in 1775, though there was one other (Nova Scotia) in North America
and eight island colonies in the western hemisphere in 1759, and three in North
America and one in the West Indies were added in 1763.
The first British measure alarming the colonists was the tightening of
Crown control over the colonial legislatures and judiciary in the royal colonies
—Virginia, Massachusetts, North and South Carolina, New York, New Jersey,
New Hampshire and Georgia—by rigid enforcement of two Crown instructions
to the governors of these colonies, previously treated as discretionary.
One of the numerous instructions issued to the royal governors was for
them to withhold consent to acts repealing or amending existing provincial acts
unless a clause was inserted suspending operation of the new act until it was
approved by the Privy Council in England. Since many acts repealing or amend
ing existing acts would have little or no value unless immediately operative,
rigid enforcement of this instruction was a serious threat to self-government
in the royal colonies. The famous Two-Penny Act controversy in Virginia is
the best known but only one of the consequences of this new policy of rigid
enforcement of royal instructions.
Another of the instructions to the royal governors directed them to make
the commissions of judges and provincial courts terminable at the pleasure
of the Crown. In New York and New Jersey, the governors had established
the practice of granting judges of the provincial Supreme Court tenure during
good behavior, (as the King was required by law to do with respect to judges
i n E n g l a n d ) , a n d other colonies h a d recently taken steps t o provide f o r s i m i l a r
tenure of their judges. Under the new policy, the governors were peremptorily
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forbidden to grant any further commissions not revocable at the King's pleasure.
And, to demonstrate that no concession would be made to past practice, the
governor of New Jersey was dismissed in 1761, when following the death of
George II, he granted good behavior tenure in renewing the commissions of
judges of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
In 1763, the British Government issued orders, injurious to all the north
ern colonies, for strict enforcement of the whole range of British acts restricting
colonial trade. These included an act of 1733 known as the Molasses Act or
Sugar Act levying prohibitive duties on colonial imports of molasses and sugar
from the French and other foreign colonies in the West Indies and South
America, designed to give British West India sugar interests a monopoly or
near monopoly of the British colonial market for sugar, molasses and rum.
Heretofore, pursuant to an understanding between colonial merchants and
British customs officers at northern colonial ports, colonial merchants had been
permitted to declare only about a tenth of their cargoes of molasses, thus in
effect reducing the duty on foreign molasses payable under the Act of 1733 from
six pence to about a half-penny a gallon, a rate which the trade could comfort
ably bear. The new enforcement policy, putting a stop to this practice, injured
not only northern colonial merchants, ship owners and farmers but also colonial
rum distillers, whose chief source of supply was foreign molasses, Indian traders
and slave traders, one of whose chief items of barter was cheap New England
rum, and innumerable colonial users of rum and molasses for household con
sumption. Furthermore, it seriously affected northern farmers and fishermen by
impairing one of the most valuable markets for their surplus farm products,
umber and fish, which northern merchants purchased to exchange for foreign
colonial molasses.
Another exasperating though less important incident of the new enforce,1
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The most injurious and obnoxious feature of the new enforcement provis
ions affected the extremely important intercolonial coastwise and river traffic in
small boats (the trucks of that period when roads were wretched and bridges
on the lower reaches of the principal rivers non-existent) which hitherto had
been carried on free of customs clearance.
This lack of customs clearance was incompatible with effective enforcement
of a British act of 1673 designed to curb intercolonial trade in certain so-called
colonial "enumerated" products, including tobacco, by levying heavy export
duties on the export of these products from one colony to another, and of
British acts of 1699 and 1732 designed to curb the growth of colonial manu
facturing by forbidding the exportation of wool, woolen yarn, woolen goods,
felt or hats from one colony to another. The lack of customs clearance also
encouraged violation of the British act of 1663, previously mentioned, forbid
ding colonial importation of most European products from any place but Great
Britain and a British act of 1721 forbidding colonial importation of Asiatic
products from any place but Great Britain. Once a cargo of European or Asiatic
products had been smuggled in from, say Holland, it could be distributed up
and down the colonial coast without further danger of detection. And so,
heedless of the effect on the colonial economy and on colonial goodwill, a pro
vision was included in the Act of 1764 forbidding any vessel, regardless of size
or build, to carry any cargo from one colony to another without obtaining from
the nearest customs officer a cocket (certified bill of lading), detailing the cargo,
to be shown to the captain of any naval vessel that might board her and to the
customs officer at the port where the cargo was to be unloaded. This meant, for
example, that if a farmer or country storekeeper at Stamford was about to ship
wheat to New York City, he would first have to spend a day going to and from
New Haven, where the nearest customs house was located, and get a certificate
covering his cargo before he dared set sail.
The Act of 1764 also contained exasperating provisions designed to en
courage the seizure and prosecution of vessels and cargo suspected of violating
acts restricting colonial trade. The new Act provided that any suit for forfeiture
under any of the acts might, at the election of the customs officer or other per
son suing for forfeiture, be brought in a colonial admiralty court, thus depriving
the owner of the benefit of trial by jury. In admiralty courts, a judge, dismissable at the pleasure of the Crown, decided issues of fact as well as of law. The
act further provided that in any dispute as to fact, the burden of proof should
be on the defendant. And, to cap the climax, the new act provided for an ad
ditional admiralty court having general jurisdiction over offenses against the
acts of trade, which was established not at New York or some other relatively
large and centrally located port, easily reached and where experienced lawyers
and good accommodations were available, but at the remote, and then raw vil
lage of Halifax, Nova Scotia.
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The Act of 1764, as previously stated, also added new restrictions on col
onial trade. Heretofore, the colonies had been permitted to ship iron and lum
ber (both of them so bulky in proportion to value as to be seriously affected
by the freight charge) directly to Ireland. This was now forbidden. Henceforth
a vessel carrying these colonial products to Ireland, must first go to a British
port and there unload and reload the iron or lumber before it could legally be
delivered in Ireland. Furthermore, the new act was designed to break up a
flourishing direct trade between the colonies and Madeira, the Azores, and the
Canary Islands, to which the North American colonists shipped surplus farm
products and lumber in exchange for wine, by levying a very heavy duty on
colonial importation of wine from these islands if the wine was imported direct
ly rather than by way of Great Britain.
The Act of 1764 also introduced the revolutionary measure of British tax
ation of the colonies for revenue. Heretofore such British levies as had been
in t e colonies were incidental to the policy of regulating colonial trade
or were or particular services rendered, such as postage. In the Act of 1764
import and export duties were now levied expressly and in fact as duties for
revenue
urthermore, in proposing the new duties (March 1764) George
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Many of the colonial assemblies passed resolutions protesting against the
new duties for revenue and restrictions on colonial trade and the prospective
stamp tax; but, apparently in the hope of propitiating the Ministry and staving
off the stamp tax by not protesting against the duties levied by the Act of 1764,
all of the protesting assemblies except New York expressly or by implication
admitted the right of Parliament to levy these duties. An illogical and potential
ly dangerous line was drawn between stamp taxes, classified as "internal" taxes,
on the one hand, and duties on imports and exports, classified as "external"
taxes, on the other, even when the latter, as in the Act of 1764, were admittedly
chiefly for revenue and not chiefly for the regulation of trade.
These colonial resolutions proved unavailing. At the next session of Par
liament, George Grenville, First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister, in
troduced and Parliament passed by an overwhelming majority an act effective
November 1, 1765, levying stamp taxes in the colonies. Acts somewhat relaxing
the restrictions imposed by the Act of 1764 were passed at this same session,
but they were of relatively little importance.
Inflamed by the various provocative British innovations culminating in the
stamp tax and by a colonial business depression which, rightly or wrongly, was
attributed to them, all thirteen colonies except Georgia prevented execution of
the stamp act by coercing the stamp distributors, one appointed for each colony,
to resign before the stamped paper they were to sell and distribute arrived from
England. Furthermore, though subject to heavy penalties for publishing their
papers on unstamped paper, most of the owners of colonial newspapers con
tinued publication, and, before long, others, including even the customs officers,
began to act without the stamped paper required by the act.
If Grenville, who was bitter against the colonies for resisting the measures
sponsored by him and his Ministry, had remained head of the Treasury and Prime
Minister, the Stamp Act would presumably have been retained and the army
and navy ordered to help execute it, in which event the American Revolution
would probably have broken out in 1766 rather than in 1775. But, before the
date the Act was due to take effect, George III, exasperated by the Grenville
Ministry for various reasons, had called in a new Ministry headed by Lord Rock
ingham and the Duke of Newcastle, the latter of whom, during his many years
of office before 1762, had pursued the policy of cultivating colonial good-will
because of the importance to Great Britain of its trade with the colonies. The
new Ministry decided to propose repeal of the Stamp Act, and, with the strong
support of William Pitt, a political free lance at this time and the acquiescence
of George III, secured the repeal of the Stamp Act in March 1766. The repeal
was accompanied by an act declaring the right of Parliament to legislate for
the colonies in all respects; but the colonists were assured by correspondents
in Great Britain that there was no reason to fear that they would be burdened
with any additional British taxes.
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The repeal of the Stamp Act ushered in a period of relative calm in the
relations between Great Britain and the colonies. Many colonists, particularly
among the well-to-do residents of Boston, Newport, New York City and Phila
delphia, had been so disgusted and alarmed by rioting in these cities accompany
ing or growing out of the movement to drive the stamp distributors from office
that they were ready to acquiesce in almost any British measures rather than risk
further disturbances and possible social revolution in the colonies. Controver
sies in New York over furnishing supplies to British troops stationed there and
over a proposed change in procedure in appeals from the New York Supreme
Court to the Privy Council sitting as a court of final appeals, were locally dis
turbing; but, in general, relations were much improved for almost a year after
the repeal.
However, the ground was laid for renewed controversy in the summer of
1766 by the King's dismissal of the Rockingham Ministry, which had failed to
redeem its promise to ask Parliament to grant a handsome annual allowance to
the King's brothers, in favor of a new Ministry. Headed by Pitt (raised to the
peerage as Lord Chatham) Lord Privy Seal, with the Duke of Grafton, First
Lord of the Treasury second in command, the new Ministry included Charles
Townshend, long an advocate of colonial taxation for revenue, in the important
office of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Early in 1767, Townshend (apparently
without protest from Pitt, who, though ill, was informed by fellow Ministers
of Townshend's project) proposed and secured an act of Parliament levying
duties for revenue on various colonial imports and exports effective September
29, 1767.
Spurred by a series of brilliant essays of John Dickinson, Philadelphia law
yer and member of the Pennsylvania Assembly, published in the Pennsylvania
Chronicle and afterwards collected and republished as a pamphlet entitled Let
ters of A Farmer in Pennsylvania, colonial Whig leaders began a campaign to
secure repeal of the Act of 1767. The former distinction between internal and
external taxes for revenue was discarded and the stand now taken that any
Parliamentary tax for revenue in the colonies was unconstitutional. The most
telling feature of the campaign was the pressure put on British merchants and
manufacturers to work for repeal by agreements among colonial merchants, re
tailers and planters not to import any but a few indispensable items from Great
Britain until the Act was repealed.
There were marked differences between the colonial opposition in the later
period than in the earlier. For one thing, though divided as to the most prudent
way to protest, during the earlier period the colonists were practically united
in opposing British taxation, whereas, in the later, many colonists, the so-called
Tories, declined to participate in the non-importation agreements and other
forms of opposition to Parliament's taxing the colonies. For another, while in
the earlier period there were a number of British measures which seemed to be
8

about equally provocative and alarming, in the later, the issue of taxation over
shadowed all others, important as some of these continued to be.
There was likewise a marked change in Great Britain. In the earlier pe
riod, there is practically no evidence of hostility to the colonists. In the later,
a number of British ministers and other members of Parliament, antagonized
by persistent colonial opposition and other factors, manifested signs of decided
anti-Americanism.
The injury to British business from the colonial non-importation agree
ments led the British Ministry, in 1770, to recommend repeal of all duties levied
by the Act of 1767 except the one on tea, which (according to Lord North who
had succeeded Grafton as First Lord of the Treasury) should be retained to
preserve the principle of Parliamentary taxation of the colonies. This recommen
dation was adopted by Parliament, and, distasteful as the retention of the tea
duty was to most of the colonists, a solution was found: though the British
maintained their claim by retaining the duty on tea, the colonists maintained
theirs by smuggling most of their tea from Holland thereby largely nullifying
the duty.
This solution was disturbed in 1773 by Parliament's passing an act, appar
ently designed chiefly if not exclusively to benefit the British East India Com
pany (which was in financial difficulties), authorizing the Company, hitherto
restricted to selling tea by auction in London, to export and sell its tea in for
eign countries and the colonies. Whether or not incidentally intended to make
the duty on colonial imports of tea effective, the new act would obviously have
this tendency, since the Company would be able to undersell smuggled tea and
would, of course, pay duty on the tea imported on its own account into the
colonies. To prevent the landing and collection of duty on tea sent by the
Company to Boston, the Boston Whigs threw the tea overboard, entailing a loss
to the Company of over £10,000.
The British Ministry retaliated by introducing and securing the passage of
the so-called Intolerable Acts. These included the Boston Port Act, prohibiting
any but small boats carrying fuel to enter or leave Boston until the destroyed tea
was paid for and the King was satisfied that the British acts of trade and cus
toms would be obeyed there. Another was the Massachusetts Government Act
permanently amending the charter of Massachusetts to provide that members of
the Massachusetts Council (the upper House of the provincial legislature) pre
viously elected should hereafter be appointed by the King. To enforce these
measures, ten regiments of British troops were sent to Boston, and Thomas
Hutchinson was replaced as Governor of Massachusetts by General Thomas
Gage, Commander-in-Chief of the British army in North America.
The Massachusetts Assembly appealed to the assemblies of the other col
onies to join with delegates from Massachusetts in an intercolonial Congress to
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decide what should be done to meet the crisis precipitated by the passage of
these acts, and, in response to this appeal, strong delegations were chosen in
one way or another by all thirteen colonies except Georgia.
This first Continental Congress, which met in Philadelphia in October
1774, passed resolutions approving the opposition by the inhabitants of Mass
achusetts to the Intolerable Acts; declaring, if an attempt was made to execute
these acts by force, that all America ought to support the opposition to such
enforcement; proposing an agreement in all the colonies not to import anything
from the British Isles on or after December 1, 1774 until several specified
British acts passed since 1763, including all the Intolerable Acts, were repealed;
petitioning the King for redress of the grievances complained of; and calling
for another intercolonial Congress to meet in Philadelphia May 10, 1775 unless
the grievances were redressed by then.
"While the Congress in Philadelphia was meeting, the situation in Mass
achusetts became very tense. A Massachusetts provincial Congress, encouraged
by the firm stand of the Continental Congress and other developments, took
steps to defend the colony from attempts fully to enforce the Intolerable Acts,
resolving that at least a quarter of the provincial militia be ready to move in
stantly to such place as a Committee of Safety chosen by the Congress might
order and voting £20,000 for the purchase of cannon, small arms and other
military supplies.
Gage at Boston, of course, kept the British Ministry informed of develop
ments in Massachusetts, and on December 15, 1774 wrote fully concerning the
warlike measures of the Massachusetts Congress. Receipt of this letter on Jan
uary 18, 1775 by Lord Dartmouth, Secretary of State in charge of colonial af
fairs, was quickly followed by British measures for war. Both Houses of Par
liament rejected motions for conciliatory measures, and, on January 27, 1775,
Dartmouth wrote Gage that "The King's Dignity, & the Honor and Safety of
the Empire required the use of force, and that, though the available force was
not as large as Gage believed was required to crush the Massachusetts rebels,
probably a smaller Force now, if put to the Test, would be able to encounter
them with a greater probability of Success than might be expected from a Great
er Army" later.
Dartmouth's letter reached Gage on April 14. On the evening of the 18th
he sent out an expedition of about 750 picked men to destroy military stores
collected at Concord, Massachusetts. Learning of Gage's movement, Whig lead
ers in Boston sent out messengers to alert the militia of the surrounding towns,
and, when an advance party of the expedition, under Major John Pitcairn,
reached Lexington, it found a body of local militia assembled on the square
there.
-1
The British fired, killing eight and wounding at least eleven Americans,
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and either before or after this fatal fire (the testimony is conflicting) one of the
British soldiers also was wounded. Proceeding to Concord the British destroye
such supplies as they could find and then set out for Boston. They encountered
sharp opposition at Concord, and on their way back, were so heavily beset that,
if timely reinforcements had not been sent by Gage, the whole British force
might have been forced to surrender. Even so, the British lost over 260 officers
and men, killed, wounded and missing, while the colonial casualties were about
60 including the 19 killed and wounded at Lexington.
Probably this bloodshed, without more, would have destroyed any chance
for peaceful settlement. But lurid tales of shocking atrocities by the enemy,
spread by both sides, clinched the matter. There was now apparently no alterna
tive but to fight to the bitter end, and so the war of the American Revolution
was launched on its eight year course of death, suffering and mounting bitterness.

There are, of course, many important and interesting details to be added
to the brief resume I have given. But in the few minutes of remaining time,
I prefer to comment on a couple of what may be termed by-products of my
study.
The first is my view as to why the British West Indian and other island
colonies did not join the mainland colonies in opposing the Stamp Act which,
proportionately, bore as heavily on them as on the mainland colonies. Numer
ous factors contributed to this; but the chief, I think, was the desperate need
at all times of West Indian colonists for the British navy to protect them
from slave insurrection and French attack and to the immense value to them o*
a heavy differential in the tariff on British importation of sugar in favor of
British colonial sugar. If the British West Indies provoked Parliament, this
differential might, probably would be repealed, with calamitous loss to the West
Indian sugar planters. The latter of these considerations was wholly absent in
the case of the thirteen mainland colonies and the former present to far less
degree.
The other by-product is my divergence from the widely held view that the
inhabitants of the old British colonies in America had long wished for inde
pendence and that therefore the American Revolution was almost inevitable as
soon as they were relieved of the need of British protection from the French in
Canada by the British conquest of Canada. In the many hundreds of colonial
letters from 1750 to 1764 read in the course of my research, I found only two,
prior to 1764, indicating any desire for independence. Moreover, not one of the
many colonial letters rejoicing over the French cession of Canada to Great
Britain in 1763 mentioned, much less exulted over any enhanced possibility of
colonial independence opened by this event. Once the disturbing British inno
vations laid before you this evening had alarmed and exasperated the colonists,
they were perhaps bolder in protest, opposition and eventual rebellion than
11

they would have been had Canada still been French. But they apparently were
reasonably content with their status prior to 1759. The British innovations of
1759-74, not the British acquisition of Canada, were, I am convinced, the de
cisive cause of the American Revolution.

Delivered October 27, 1953
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RELIGION AND THE SCEPTICAL TRADITION
BY FRANKLIN L. BAUMER

The twentieth century, particularly since the Great War of 1914-1918, has
been called a number of things more or less appropriate: "age of uncertainty"
and "anxiety," "age of unreason," "age of suspicion." But from the point of
view of religion, which I propose to treat chiefly in this lecture, no term more
exactly hits the mark than "age of longing."
This is the title of a recent novel by Arthur Koestler, and to lay my foun
dations I shall have to describe its central motif, if very briefly. The Age of
Longing is a religious book, not in any narrow or credal sense but in the
sense that it deals with what are essentially religious themes, faith and doubt,
death and pain, and apocalypse. The scene is Paris in the 1950's, the dramatis
personae a heterogeneous group of people, mostly intellectuals, from all parts
of the western world. What these people all have in common—with the signal
exception of Fyodor Nikitin, the Russian cultural attache—is a longing for
faith, faith in a meaningful universe. "We are the dispossessed," says Julien
Delattre, the poet of the company, —"the dispossessed of faith; the physically
or spiritually homeless."1 "LET ME BELIEVE IN SOMETHING" is the ag
onized cry of Hydie, the American girl who had been educated in a convent
but who had since lost her faith.2 It is this longing for faith that draws her to
the Communist Nikitin as to a magnet. He at least believes in something, even
if it is only a Utopia measured in terms of kilowatt hours, bushels, and tons.
In the end Nikitin's faith repels Hydie, but it is her fate, and it is the fate of
the others too, not to be able to crawl back into the sheltering womb of tra
ditional Christianity. "I won't have any of your patent medicine," says Delattre
to the Roman Catholic priest, Father Millet. "What you ask of me is the un
conditional surrender of my critical faculties."3
Koestler's book is obviously at once an allegory and a parable. Under a
fictional guise it seeks to represent real people and a real situation in the western
world today. Koestler, who as much as any contemporary writer has seen and
personally experienced the agony of Europe over the past thirty years, describes
in his book what is essentially a new species of homo sapiens: the hollow,
homeless, dispossessed man, the spiritually displaced person if you like, who
drifts—like the characters in Aldous Huxley's novels of the early 1920's, but
also unlike them in that he is painfully conscious of drifting and of longing
not to drift. The story also points a moral. This, says Koestler, who obviously
does not belong to the art-for-art's sake school of literature, is not a healthy
1 Arthur

Koestler, The Age of Longing (New York, 1951), pp. 28-9.
Ibid., p. 32.
3 Ibid., p. 352, 354.

2
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state of mind to be in, and to the extent that it has captured the intellectual and
political leaders of society, it threatens to pollute the very springs of western
civilization. People who have no faith but who long for a faith become schizo
phrenic, and their creative faculties and even their will to resist tyranny dry up.
When this happens on any large scale, civilization itself succumbs to a longing
for death, the Freudian death-wish. What can be done about it? Well, says
Delattre, who often seems to speak for Koestler, the only hope lies in the emer
gence of a new transcendental faith," not identical with the old religious
faiths, which will nullify the false religion of "Society" by which western man
has been living for several hundred years. Who will invent this "new transcen
dental faith ? There is the rub, for "religions are not invented; they material
ise." We shall just have to wait for it to happen.4
Now doubtless Koestler exaggerates, not only in order to point his moral
but also because he is an ex-Communist, for it is a fact, I think, that ex-Communists are prone to see too much faith on one side of the iron curtain and
too little on the other. It is well to remember too that Koestler has mainly
western Europe in view, and not North America. Yet he did not dream it all
up either, of that we can be reasonably sure. This is external evidence, much
of it circumstantial perhaps, to show that is in reality an "age of longing." I
can barely allude to the evidence here: the spiritual odysseys, in part autobi
ographical, like Huxley's Ends and Means and C. E. M. Joad's The Recovery
of Belief, the psychologist Carl Jung s discovery of "modern man in search of
a soul ; hollowness and loneliness as a major theme of modern literature
(Koestler is by no means the only writer to report the longing of modern man);
the anxiety and forlornness described by the atheistic existentialists; the
escape from freedom of countless people to the totalitarian systems supply a
faith of sorts; even some sociological evidence, such as the remarkable survey
of religious belief in England made by Rowntree and Lavers shortly after World
War II.5 Perhaps the best evidence comes from ourselves, for how many of us
can truthfully say that we do not share in some degree the longing of Delattre
and Hydie.
Assuming, then, that at least to some extent Koestler mirrors a real state
o mind, we want to know how this state of mind crystallized and what if any
thing can be done about it-not out of idle curiosity, but because it is an existenia problem a problem of deep personal concern to all of us. In this lecture I
propose to take up these two questions, not with the idea that I can fully answer
them the time is too short even if I had the knowledge and wisdom to do sothem" / C°nV1Ctl0n that the h,stonan is peculiarly fitted to throw light upon
themand to make suggestions. For the historian sees, as people without histor4
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ical training do not always see, that the two questions are interconnected. That
is to say, what to do about any given situation depends to a large extent upon
how that situation developed historically. As Edmund Burke pointed out a propos of the French Revolution, men and nations are what they are because of
their history, and to achieve workable solutions to their problems they must
think and act within the framework of their history.
Now the first question—the "how" question—resolves itself into two sub
sidiary questions: (1) why does the prodigal son—the Delattres, the Hydies—
find it so hard to return home to his ancestral faith? and (2) why, at the same
time, does he long for a faith ? The answer to the first of these subsidiary ques
tions is the sceptical tradition. The prodigal son cannot go home, or at least he
can go only part of the way home, because he is the heir of a tradition which
at fundamental points challenges the religious tradition, the Judaeo-Christian
tradition, of the West. Whenever he takes the notion to pack up and go home,
the shades of Voltaire and Ernest Renan and Sigmund Freud and many other
eminent sceptics rise up around him and persuade him to stay where he is—
wherever that is. This sceptical tradition had its origins long ago in headwaters
of the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance. These headwaters emptied into
rivulets, and the rivulets, coming from all directions, eventually flowed together
to form a mighty river which swept innumerable people before it, at first mostly
the educated classses, but later many from the masses too.
It is convenient to think of the sceptical tradition as developing in three
main stages. "This plague," says the American colonel in Koestler's book,
"must have started in the eighteenth century" ("plague," incidentally, is the
colonel's word for it, and not mine).6 Actually, the eighteenth century marks
the second, and not the first stage in its history. The trial of the Christian God
by the rationalists and self-styled "philosophers"—the "intellectual cause celehre" of the eighteenth century, as Carl Becker called it—could never have
taken place without an initial stage in which philosophical and scientific sceptics,
most of them sincere Christians, prepared the way for religious scepticism by
dismantling traditional conceptions of nature and knowledge. Nevertheless, the
colonel was basically right. The eighteenth century was the first great age of re
ligious scepticism, in the sense that it then became the talk of the town, that is
to say, fashionable not only in esoteric intellectual circles, but also in cafe-socie
ty, among the middle and upper classes. Even the powers that be took a hand
in the trial of the God of the Catholics and Protestants when at the end of the
century several determined attempts were made at the top to dechristianize rev
olutionary France.
In the nineteenth century the sceptical tradition moved into a third phase.
The majority of the eighteenth-century dechristianizers were not, after all, anti6
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religious, at least not on the surface. Voltaire's battle-cry "crush the infamous
thing" referred, not to religion as such, but to a particular kind of religion,
revealed religion, Christian orthodoxy. He could not conceive of nature with
out a God to create it, a watch without a watchmaker. Robespierre, at the
Feast of the Supreme Being in June, 1794, not only applied the torch to a
symbolic figure of Atheism but also tried to substitute for the old established
religion a new religion of the Supreme Being. And he was by no means the
only revolutionary leader who could not conceive of a society without some kind
of organized church to uphold morals and civic spirit. In these respects the
majority of the religious sceptics of the eighteenth century looked backward as
well as forward. But in the next century men in ever increasing numbers con
trived nothing less than the ' death of God," as Nietzsche so dramatically
phrased it, and not merely the Christian God. The century of August Comte
and David Friedrich Strauss, of Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx, of Sir
Leslie Stephen and Sir James Frazer, witnessed the triumphant march of
agnosticism (the word was invented by Thomas Henry Huxley, and it sig
nified suspended judgment), of materialism, and perhaps most ominous of
all, religious indifference. Religion, in the traditional sense of belief in the
gods, was debunked in countless new definitions: religion is the opiate of
the people, religion is myth, religion is self-projection, religion is anthro
pology, religion is what man eats, an instrument in the class struggle; religion is
childishness, a phenomenon now outmoded in man's evolution toward control
of nature, and so on. The new breed of intellectuals were not loath, moreover,
as so many of their eighteenth-century forbears had been loath, to discuss reli
gion before the servants, and there is evidence to show that the servants were
beginning to learn their lesson. In view of this sceptical drift, is it any
wonder that the prodigal son left home in the first place and then afterwards
found it difficult to go back, however much he might desire to do so. Throughout t e three stages, of course, Christianity was by no means obliterated; indeed,
at times it showed a remarkable ability to counter-attack, as in the Methodist
and evangelical movements in England and in some phases of the so-called
romantic movement. Yet there can be no doubt that for the first time in its
history Christianity and not only Christianity but religion in general in the
nineteenth century-was forced to beat a serious retreat and to yield considerable territory to a powerful enemy.
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advantage. On the other side, the sceptics were contemptuously labelled "Cacouacs," a tribe descended from the Titans, who emitted poison whenever they
spoke.7 This was, of course, a gross misrepresentation. The sceptical tradition
was the result, not of a diabolical plot, but of righteous indignation and honest
doubt, and failure to recognize this fact at the outset can lead to some very false
conclusions about the present-day religious situation. Furthermore, this doubt
was not the result of abstract thinking, or at least it was not wholly so. As I
see it, great changes in the human consciousness never come about in just that
way. Change is, so to speak, from the bottom up as well as from the top down,
or from the outside in as well as from the inside out. The intellectuals articu
late the change—who else?—but they do so as much and more because they
live in a life-situation as because they cogitate on the logical possibilities of an
intellectual problem. That is to say, events in the world around them incite
them to radically new ways of thinking which in another kind of environment
might never have occurred to anyone.
How, then, if not as the result of a plot, was modern religious scepticism
generated? To answer this question satisfactorily we should have to subject the
first stage of the sceptical tradition to a much more complete analysis than we
can do here. We should have to assess the effects upon religious thinking of
such apparently far removed events as western Europe's contacts with extraChristian cultures and the warfare between the sects within western Christen
dom; the creeping secularization of the Roman hierarchy in the late Middle
Ages; the clash of rival philosophies and theologies during the Renaissance and
Reformation which stimulated the pyrrhonism of a Michel de Montaigne, the
minimal theology of a Sebastian Castellio, and the incipient deism of a Lord
Herbert of Cherbury; the tendency of the Reformation, on its Zwinglian and
left-wing side, to empty the world of its religious symbolic content; the rise
of a middle-class culture with its inevitably new attitude toward work and man's
rational control of his environment; the reduction of the world to mathematical
categories by Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes; etc.
From the complex interplay of these and other factors there gradually grew
up in men's minds a new idea of nature, a new conception of knowledge, and
a new vision of time, all of which militated against the old religious interpreta
tion of the world and man. The modern world has produced two ideas of na
ture which have been damaging to the cause of religion in the long run. The
first of these ideas pictured nature as a machine, the second described it as red
in tooth and claw. What these two ideas had in common was that they provided
a naturalistic, as opposed to a teleological or theological, explanation for physi
cal and biological events. By the "mechanical philosophy," as Robert Boyle dub
bed it in the seventeenth century, all natural effects could be explained by the
7
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laws of local motion, without having recourse to final or formal causes except,
possibly, in the first instance. Back of this philosophy lay an understandable
desire to control nature which could be achieved only if science was divorced
from theology and metaphysics, principally Aristotelian metaphysics. But what
ever its origins, its result was to drive purpose and ultimately intelligent design
too out of nature, and to encourage what I like to call naturalistic thinking—
by naturalistic thinking I mean the habit of supposing that the naturalistic ex
planation accounts for everything, that "nature" is all that there is, that nature
in no way points beyond itself. In a world increasingly dominated by science
and scientific concepts this habit inevitably spread to other realms of thought,
notably to psychology, political theory, and history.
It could never have proceeded to such sceptical lengths, however, if it had
not soon become intertwined in people's minds with a sceptical conception of
knowledge. The foundation of morality," Thomas Henry Huxley wrote in
1889, is to have done, once for all, with lying; to give up pretending to
believe that for which there is no evidence, and repeating unintelligible prop
ositions about things beyond the possibilities of knowledge."8 Huxley's state
ment epitomizes the empirical theory of knowledge which descended from John
Locke through David Hume and the Positivists, and which by Huxley's day had
become an inveterate habit of thinking among educated people. Extreme em
piricism limited knowledge to ideas derived from sense impressions, i. e., the
physical world, and checked by experiment; everything else was set down as
opinion or misguided "enthusiasm." It demanded sensible evidence for every
thing, and Hume, for example, showed how there was no reliable evidence for
miracles or even the engineer-God whose existence most of the early mechan
ists inferred from the wonderful order of nature. Historically, this empiricism
represented an attempt by men of peace and common sense to reach firm ground
in a world of conflicting philosophies and orthodoxies. But it also registered
a profound shift of interest from metaphysics to physics, from "vain" specula
tion to knowledge that could be useful to man in this world. In Locke's phrase,
we sha|l not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds,
1 we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they
are very capable. "9 The ultimate effect of this kind of thinking was to promote
religious agnosticism, for it denied the human mind access to that "vast ocean
o Being upon which all true religion depends. In Huxley's day, it should be
noted, agnosticism was reinforced by still another conception of knowledge
which was born of the growing historical consciousness of the nineteenth cenP/'
8
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group, and Ernest Troeitsch, among others, was rightly worried about the prob
lem which this historical relativism posed for religion.
Perhaps, though, the principal factor in the rise of scepticism lies deeper
still, in the new vision of time which fired Francis Bacon's imagination and
which is already so pronounced in the great quarrel between the "Ancients"
and the "Moderns" at the end of the seventeenth century. In Carl Becker's
description, this vision, at least as the Enlightenment understood it, was dedi
cated to the following propositions (significantly, Becker calls it "the religion
of the Enlightenment"): "(1) man is not natively depraved; (2) the end of
life is life itself, the good life on earth . . . ; (3) man is capable, guided solely
by the light of reason and experience, of perfecting the good life on earth."10
This was substantially a vision of power, born in an age when new vistas of
power were opening up to western Europeans through geographical and eco
nomic expansion and with the development of modern science.
On the surface the "Kingdom of Man," as Bacon called it, does not appear
to be unreligious, and, indeed, the social gospellers of the nineteenth century
seized on it as the ideal expression of Christian love on earth. But look a little
beneath the surface and I think you will see that at essential points it outflanked
the religious position. The principal end of mankind was said to be "happiness,"
and in few of the many books written on that subject in the eighteenth century
was anything said about misfortune, suffering, or tragedy as part of the perma
nent datum of things here on earth. Moreover, the means to the end was "change
from without" rather than "change from within." It was assumed that man
did not need to be changed inside, that new and better methods of knowledge
and education, better laws and better political and economic institutions—in a
word, social engineering—were the thing. Thus, the active virtues were rated
above the passive and contemplative, and philosophy itself, in proportion as it
became imbued with this vision, devoted itself to instigating social change,
to getting things done, as opposed to reflecting upon the meaning of what had
been done (as in the "philosophy" of the Enlightenment, which revolted against
the metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century as well as the Middle Ages;
and Karl Marx, who revolted against the essentially contemplative philosophy
of Hegel). Perhaps the most important thing about it was its focus on so
ciety—in Koestler's phrase, the horizontal "Man-Society" relationship as op
posed to the vertical "Man-Universe" relationship.11 The article "Philosopher
in the great Encyclopedia of the eighteenth century expresses this relationship
neatly. "Civil society is, so to speak, a divinity for him (the philosopher] on
earth; he burns incense to it, he honors it by probity, by an exact attention to
his duties, and by a sincere desire not to be a useless or embarrassing member
Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven,
1932), pp. 102-103. I have omitted Becker's fourth proposition.
11 For these categories, and also for the categories "change from within" and "change
from without," see Koestler's essay The Yogi and the Commissar.
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of it."12 The vision of the Kingdom of Man was in reality a substitute faith
which a religious man could hold, at least in its entirety, only at his peril.
So much for the reasons why, as Edward Gibbon once put it, "in modern
times a latent and even involuntary scepticism adheres to the most pious dispo
sitions."12 Principally for these reasons the sceptical tradition had reached a
high water mark in the infidel half century,' as George Bernard Shaw called
the age of Darwin. But already the tide had begun to recede somewhat, and
it is a matter of record allusion has already been made to some of the docu
mentary evidence, and that is all we can do here—that it has continued to re
cede down to our own times. Basil Willey speaks of a "counter-drift toward
religion."14 This is undoubtedly too strong, and even Willey qualifies his state
ment by remarking that it has not occurred on any general scale. As I see it,
what has been happening more and more in recent years is that the will to doubt
has become intermixed in peoples minds with a new will to believe—I mean,
o course, believe in a religious way. There are good psychological, philo
sophical, and existential reasons why this should be so. William James once
wrote to an English rationalist friend of his: "Your bogey is superstition, my
\vr\7

• • • In my essay [he refers to his famous essay on "The
delivered in 1896} the evil shape was a vision of 'Science'
in the form of abstraction, priggishness and sawdust, lording it over all. Take
e steri ist scientific prig and cad you know, compare him with the richest
e lgious inte ect you know, and you would not, any more than I would, give
the former the exclusive right of way."12 The interesting thing about this statef
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senberg's principle of indeterminacy or uncertainty in nature). "Modern scien
tific leaders," observed R. G. Collingwood, "talk about God in a way that
would have scandalized most scientists of fifty years ago."17 What lies behind
these two statements is a conviction, now fairly widespread, that it is not pos
sible to construct a mechanical model of nature. Matter, it appears, is energy
and not inert atoms acted upon by mechanical forces; the behaviour of individ
ual electrons cannot be certainly predicted; space and time are relative to the
observer, etc. In other words, there is more to nature than science used to
think. Ergo, perhaps nature is, after all, an "organism" with a creative purpose,
or a symbol of a wider reality, or a thought in the mind of God, or something
like. At any rate, so we are told by the likes of Alfred North Whitehead, Eddington, and Sir James Jeans.
But at bottom, of course, the new will to believe traces to an existential
situation. I need not belabor the point since it is so very obvious. The King
dom of Man which the eighteenth century promised by the twenty-first century
at the very latest does not seem to be materializing, just the reverse, in fact, if
the Spenglers and Orwells are to be believed. The twentieth century, especially
in western Europe, has had a great shock. All the external machinery of which
western man had such great expectations has turned against him, just as Mat
thew Arnold and Samuel Butler predicted that it might. Another way of say
ing the same thing is that it is now understood, after two world holocausts and
the recrudescence of barbarism in Nazi Germany and elsewhere, that machines
can be used by men to evil as well as good purpose. It is also widely under
stood that evil is not simply the result of bad social conditions but that it is, to
quote C. E. M. Joad, "endemic in the heart of man."18 These revelations have
knocked the props out from under that substitute faith which, as I suggested,
had become the working philosophy of a great many modern people. As a re
sult there was bound to be much longing for a faith, and the way would seem
to have been opened for a fresh exploration of that inner world where preemi
nently man meets the gods.
But western man—I speak generally, of course—had learned not to believe
in the gods. And so we are back again to the problem posed at the beginning
of this lecture. The Delattres and Hydies—or generically, modern man—are
on the horns of a dilemma. They long to believe, they even will to believe, but
what to believe in is a problem for them. Two traditions, the sceptical tradition
and the Judaeo-Christian tradition, pull them in opposite directions and even
checkmate each other. What if anything can be done about this situation?
There are, it seems to me, four logical possibilities and all four have ad
vocates in contemporary thought. The first possibility is that in the realm of
religion western man has reached the point of no return. On this view the
17
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spiritual longing observable in the western world today represents a "failure of
nerve." It will pass, or at any rate it ought to pass, for religion clearly belongs
to the infantile stage of human evolution, and progress depends upon putting it
behind us and growing up. In Sigmund Freud's classic summary, "criticism
has nibbled at the authenticity of religious documents, natural science has
shown up the errors contained in them, and the comparative method of research
has revealed the fatal resemblance between religious ideas revered by us and the
mental productions of primitive ages and peoples."19 The trouble with this
statement is that it is a half-truth only. It is correct as far as it goes, but at
bottom it constitutes a serious misreading of history. Militant agnosticism of
this kind ignores the possibly ontological validity of tradition, specifically the
religious tradition, which for all its mistakes and even arrogance may after all
be found to have preserved deep insights into the nature of being. It also ig
nores the evidence in history for the religious nature of man. I know that I
am on debatable ground here, but I am impressed, as I believe most students
of history must be impressed, by the sprouting up in the modern world of new
religious or pseudo-religious cults to take the place of the old cults. It is as if
there were something in man s nature which makes him ceaselessly seek objects
of devotion outside himself, objects which, moreover, are located in a meta
physical order of some kind. It might be argued pragmatically that in the long
run failure to find such objects stunts the imagination and reduces the vital
powers and thus affects adversely the history of civilization.
The second possibility is a return to the religion of grandmother. Arnold
Toynbee aptly calls this way "archaism," and it is exhibited at the present time
in the new supernaturalism, in the theologies known as neo-Thomism and neoorthodoxy. These theologies are not without wisdom, but it is extremely doubt
ful whether they speak effectively to the condition of modern man. If the
sceptics underestimate the value of religious tradition, the neo-supernaturalists
o\ er oo t e necessity of change. They speak as though it were possible for peopie to go back to a view of the universe which originated and flourished in clites very different from our own, and to accept that view upon authorities
which modern man cannot accept. As we have seen, Julien Delattre resisted
Father Millet's persuasions on this score. They speak, moreover, as though the
sceptical traditions were easily circumvented, as though it did not raise genuine
problems about nature, knowledge, and time. As Toynbee says, "Archaistic re
ligious movements are intellectually indefensible because the antecedent Ration
alism that has driven a traditional religous faith off the field does not in reality
1KC
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quest will not find themselves able to worship God again in spirit and in truth
if they seek to open for themselves a homeward spiritual path by deliberately
closing their mind's critical eye. . . ."20
Unfortunately, Toynbee has no alternative to suggest, except to cling and
wait." This, however, is a third possibility, and it too is a fairly common atti
tude today, to be found, for instance, in persons as unlike as Toynbee and
Koestler, Simone Weil and Karl Barth. I have already cited the passage from
The Age of Longing in which Julien Delattre argues the need for the emer
gence of a new transcendental faith which would reestablish relations between
western man and the universe.
"Who is going to invent it?" asked Hydie.
"There is the rub. Religions are not invented; they materialise. . .
"And all we can do is to wait for it to happen?"
"Oh, one can always go on fiddling with programmes and platforms.
But it comes to the same thing."21
Theologically, this "waiting" is construed as the dependence of gravity
{i.e., the sin that holds man to the earth) upon grace. Modern man cannot
simply will a return to religion, says Simone Weil; he can only wait for belief
to percolate down through his scepticism. In other words, it is modern man s
fate to live in a state of religious indecision and waiting, which will be relieved,
if we are to believe Toynbee, only after a "painful period of probation and
when the Holy Spirit listeth and not before.22
There is still a fourth possibility, however, which Toynbee does not de
velop but which deserves to be developed. This is an attitude which attempts
to combine religion and scepticism; a via media, so to speak, which steers a
course between the two traditions. Such an attitude would hardly land the home
less in a new age of certainty, but it would provide them perhaps with some
temporary shelter from the elements and give them something to do while they
were waiting.
Looking back over western man's spiritual odyssey since the seventeenth
century there would appear to be two chief stumbling blocks to the creative
flow of religious life. One comes from the side of traditional religion, the other
from the side of scepticism. On the one side traditional religion I mean the
religion of the churches, the orthodoxies—claimed to know too much. Largely
on the authority of an external revelation it claimed to know, in detail, God s
attributes, how his will was done, why the world was created and how it would
end, the decisive events of history, etc. Simultaneously, the sceptical tradition
20
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claimed to know too little about what Herbert Spencer called the "Unknow
able." It began, as we have seen, with a great profession of unknowing which
simply did not permit human access to metaphysical planes of reality. Between
these two extremes there could be no meeting ground at all, as the great "war
fare between science and theology" in the nineteenth century clearly showed.
But suppose we were to admit frankly, with the sceptics, that what the theolo
gies say about God and the world is myth, image, symbol, that is to say, that
it is neither the literal nor the whole truth, not the thing-in-itself, but a poor
human attempt to express the inexpressible. Suppose we were also to hold,
however, as our existential situation might now prompt us to hold, that these
myths and symbols are not merely human projections, not illusions, but reflec
tions of mankind s deepest psychic experience. Might these twin admissions
not open the gates and portals to a kind of religion which would satisfy twen
tieth-century man s spiritual longing without at the same time necessitating the
surrender of his critical faculties: a religion which avoided both theological
overstatements and sceptical aridity; a religion based upon psychological ex
perience but which made a bridge from psychology to metaphysics; in a word,
an experiential religion.
There has been a groping toward this kind of religion in recent years. One
calls to mind, for example, Professor Basil Willey's lectures to the divinity
school of the University of Cambridge in which he argued for a Christianity
based upon the unshakable foundation of "repentance and rebirth" rather than
assent to doctrines and propositions."23 Willey claimed descent from such
thinkers as Coleridge and Soren Kierkegaard for both of whom, although in
very different ways, Christianity signified "life" as opposed to a theory or a
concept. He might also have mentioned Coleridge's contemporary, the great
German theologian Schleiermacher, who tried to reconstruct Christian theology
on an empirical basis, deducing doctrine not from an external revelation nor
rom metaphysical principles, but from man's emotional needs and feelings.
Wi ley s own contemporary, the psychologist Carl Jung, explores farther than
Sc leiermacher and finds that religion is experience of a side of life—he calls it
the collective unconscious'' to which the conscious mind does not usually have
access. Jung s formulation is particularly helpful in the current religious dilemma.
For he speaks as a scientist and yet takes an affirmative attitude toward religion.
He not only recogm.es the therapeutic value of religion but concedes that in the
religious experience man may have contact with a supra-personal and even metaBUtrat the Same time he d0ubtS that
d t
dogma
ever corresponds to objective facts of the universe. For Jung, as for Coleridge
religion is not so much an idea as an experience which can never be captured
successfully or accurately in words; it can only be projected in symbols
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ning of an answer to Hydie's desperate plea, "let me believe in something."
Doubtless, in her pessimistic frame of mind she would reiterate that religions
are not invented and that there is nothing for it but to wait. But I am reminded
at this point of something William James once said about waiting. What James
said was, to be sure, in rebuttal of a somewhat different position, that assumed
by the so-called "rugged and manly school of science" which advocated living
in complete suspension of judgment in religious matters, but it applies as well
to the Hydies of the twentieth century as to the W. K. Cliffords of the nine
teenth. Said James: ". . . this command that we shall put a stopper on our
heart, instincts, and courage, and wait—acting of course meanwhile more or
less as if religion were not true—till doomsday, or till such time as our intellect
and senses working together may have raked in evidence enough,—this com
mand, I say, seems to me the queerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic
cave."24 No one wishes to be duped, least of all the modern heir of the scepti
cal tradition. But, as James also remarked, unless people meet the religious hy
pothesis half-way, they may never make the gods' acquaintance.
I would interpret "half-way" to mean that there are things that the sceptic
can do while he is waiting. He can, for instance, do the very thing that Toynbee
says he cannot do, namely winnow the chaff out of the traditional religions.
This is what the German Protestant theologian Rudolf Bultmann has recently
attempted to do with his program of "demythologization." Bultmann believes
that the old mythological mode of thought which represented God in human
terms, and as interpenetrating nature and history, is "finished"; modern man,
brought up to think of both the world and the human personality as closed
systems of causality, cannot accept or even grasp such a view. He therefore
advocates, to the dismay of Karl Barth and other right-wing critics, the radical
demythologization of Christianity and its reinterpretation in existential rather
than in mythological or historical terms. On this interpretation, the Easter faith
ceases to be a faith in a cosmic or historical event which occurred approximately
two thousand years ago in a mythological universe; it becomes an understand
ing of man's situation here and now, and indeed at all times and in all places:
man fearful, lost in a world of impermanence and death; man vainly striving
to overcome his forlornness by reliance upon self; and failing in this, finding
his redemption at last in an experience of the saving grace of God.
To sum up, the modern sceptic, whether he takes the demythologizing way
of Bultmann or the mythologizing way of Jung or some other way, can take
stock of his religious position in the light of the two traditions of which he is
the heir. This stock-taking involves, above all, the reassessment of his religious
tradition in terms that are meaningful to him, the decoding and rewording of
ancient concepts which in the course of time have all but lost their meaning.
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Probably this is a task primarily for laymen—especially laymen with a pro
nounced sense of history—rather than clergymen whose vocation commits them
to an orthodox position.
Yet the historic churches too can help in this endeavour, principally by
assisting the sceptic to develop personal habits and mental attitudes upon which
all profound religious life would seem to depend, but which have been lost
sight of amidst the complexity and perplexity and noise of modern life: to wit,
participation in the great cycle of the religious year; reestablishing a connection
with the "world of silence," as Max Picard would say;25 and recovering the
ancient, contemplative attitude toward work and leisure, which still another
European Catholic, Josef Pieper, urges us to do.26 These are things which the
modern sceptic can do toward satisfying his longing to believe. Whether he
will do them, in such measure as to make any difference in his personal integra
tion or in the integration of western civilization, is a moot question. The his
torian cannot say that he will do them. For unlike the scientist or the prophet
the historian knows better than to predict what will happen and what will not
happen.

Delivered October 25, 1955
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ERASMUS: THE SCHOLAR AND THE WORLD
BY MYRON P. GILMORE
The debate on the relative merits of the active and the contemplative life
has been one of the constant themes of western culture. The contrast between
these two ideals has, of course, appeared sporadically and in various forms
in other civilizations but from the time when the Greeks first speculated on
ethics and politics it has been particularly characteristic of the west. I need only
recall the formulations of Aristotle, the writings of Cicero on otium and negotium, especially the Somnium Scipionis, the variations on the classical theme
introduced by Christianity and developed by the church fathers, and the con
tinuation of the debate in medieval philosophy and literature.
In the Italian Renaissance this discussion entered a new and more intense
phase. The conception of the problem in the early Renaissance may be well
illustrated by reference to one of Petrarch's most characteristic compositions,
his Letters to the Ancient Dead which constitute the last book of the Epistolae
de rebus familiaribus. These are the letters in which Petrarch imagined that
he was writing directly to the admired literary heroes of antiquity, wishing that
he had been born in their time, condoling with them on the loss of large por
tions of their work, speculating on what they would have thought of the his
torical developments which they did not live to see and which they could
neither have predicted nor imagined. In these epistles Petrarch shows the
strength of his nostalgia for the ancient world and his desire to come into more
immediate contact with it, but at the same time, he reveals his consciousness of
the distance which divided his own age from that of Greece and Rome.
Among these letters to ancient authors the two addressed to Cicero indicate
something of Petrarch's views on the relative merits of the active and the con
templative life. In 1345 Petrarch had discovered a manuscript of Cicero s let
ters to Atticus. He had always been an enthusiastic admirer of such of Cicero s
moral and political works as were available to him, but he now discovered in
reading the letters that many of Cicero's acts were less consistent and less ideal
istic than he had supposed. The figure whose precepts for the conduct of go\
ernment he had so highly praised now turned out to have been in action timid
and irresolute. Under the impact of this feeling Petrarch addressed Cicero dir
ectly:
I have read your letters through to the end. ... I have heard you
speak on many subjects, and give voice to many laments and wa\er
frequently in your opinions. . . . O you restless and distressed spirit,
or, to speak in your own words, you rash and unfortunate old man.
Why did you forsake that peaceful ease that befits a man of y0UJ
years? What false luster of glory involved you, although weighed
27

down with years, in the wrangles and frays proper to youth
?
What good does it do to instruct others and discourse eternally on the
virtues, even in the most eloquent terms, if at the same time one gives
a deaf ear to one's own instruction? How much better would it have
been for a man of declining years and especially for one devoted to
studies ... to have lived his last days in the quiet of the country,
meditating ... on that everlasting life and not on this fleeting one.
How much better would it have been never to have held office, never
to have longed for triumphs, never to have boasted of crushing such
men as Catiline. But it is vain to talk thus. Farewell forever my
Cicero.1
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formulation in Cristoforo Landino's Camaldulensian Disputations. These were
dialogues written at the court of Lorenzo de' Medici and the protagonists include
Lorenzo himself and Leon Battista Alberti, the great architect and sculptor.
Scholars who came to Italy from northern Europe carried back with them to
the courts and universities of their own countries a lively interest in this debate
and it became a theme of academic and literary speculation at the very time
when many scholars and men of letters were feeling in their own lives the
pressure of making a choice between the market place and the study.
In this continuing discussion the figure of Erasmus came to occupy a cen
tral position. In the first place his own life could be regarded as a variation on
the theme. He had left the monastery to work as a scholar in the world. In the
second place he confronted throughout his long career, at many times and in
many different ways, the issue of the duty of the man of letters to the society
in which he lived. Did the scholar best serve his high purposes by remaining
independent and not involving himself in the councils of courts and kings ? Or,
on the contrary, did the more educated man have a positive obligation to offer
his talents and training to those in authority in church and state? When Eras
mus' great friend, Sir Thomas More, entered the service of Henry VIII, Eras
mus felt that More had made a mistake and this feeling was confirmed in the
last bitter years when More lost his head upon the block. Erasmus' modern
biographers have continued to differ in their interpretation of his character.
Some have presented him as a timid and neurotic individual who remained
above the battle and was afraid to commit himself on the great issues of his
age. Others have recognized in Erasmus a man of courage who desperately
tried to build a third force between two extremes neither of which he could
accept. The issue of how much Erasmus took part in the active political life
of his time is a complicated one and one which it is impossible to examine in
all its aspects in this brief lecture. I propose, however, this evening to consider
three episodes in the career of Erasmus in each of which may be seen a varia
tion of the general problem of the duty of the scholar in the world. These three
episodes are: first, Erasmus' decision to leave Rome in 1509 and return to Eng
land where Henry VIII had come to the throne; second, the occasion ten years
later in 1519 when Erasmus wrote to the Elector Frederick of Saxony urging
that he protect Luther; third, I shall consider Erasmus' refusal in 1527 to edit
the De Monarchia of Dante when he had been requested to do so by the chan
cellor of the Emperor Charles V. In each of these cases we are fortunate enough
to have, if not the words of Erasmus himself, at least the letters directed to him
ty a contemporary. Consideration of these three incidents may therefore serve
to define more generally the characteristics of Erasmus' position throughout his
life.
Was

Erasmus came to Italy in 1506 when he was about forty years old, but it
the end of February, 1509, before he achieved what had long been his am29

bition and saw the Eternal City for the first time.4 His sojourn there lasted until
the beginning of July with one interruption for a journey to Naples where he
visited the cave of the Cumaean sibyl. Even though his visit was limited to
these few months in the spring of 1509 and he never returned, Erasmus had an
opportunity to see Rome at a stirring moment in the history of politics and of
art. Pope Julius II was approaching the height of his power and the climactic
years of his reign. In 1508 the League of Cambrai had been formed by France,
the Empire, and the Papacy against the power of Venice, and in May of the
very year in which Erasmus came to Rome was fought the Battle of Agnadello.
The pope s political ambitions were matched by his determination to reconstmct
and enlarge St. Peter s and the Vatican. Bramante had been commissioned to
begin work on the new St. Peter's in 1506, and the pope had presided over the
laying of the cornerstone in April of that year. At the Vatican Bramante had
also designed and was building the Belvedere connected to the old palace by
the long wings which framed the courtyards. In the Sistine chapel Michelangelo
had begun the painting of the frescoes of the ceiling in 1508 and by the spring
of the next year Raphael had already been at work for some months on the
Stanza della segnatura. These names suffice to recall what was happening in
ome in the year of Erasmus visit but how much of all this he actually saw we
do not know. No letters written by him at this time have survived and only
two written to him. What is known of his daily activities in Rome and his re
actions to the contemporary scene must be gathered from references in his later
correspondence and in his literary and scholarly works. From these it is clear
at he knew many people in the circles of the Vatican.5 It is entirely possible
aL he was taken by his friend Inghirami who was one of the papal secretaries
o see Raphael at work in the apartments of the Pope. We may permit our
selves to imagine that Erasmus may have exchanged words with the painter or
even contributed suggestions to the iconography of the Segnatura as many of
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ironically offered as the restitution of the pure text of the New Testament.6
Scattered here and there in his later writings there are a few references to his
Roman visit but nothing in Rome seems to have impressed him so deeply as,
for example, the spectacle he had seen in Bologna when Julius II made his en
try into the city after its conquest.7
Erasmus' stay in Rome came to an end when he received letters from his
English friends announcing the death of Henry VII and the accession of Henry
VIII. In particular the invitation of his old friend Lord Mountjoy urged him
to return to England. Here were his cherished friends Thomas More and John
Colet and here his interests in Biblical and in Greek studies had been first
awakened. Here also the friends of the new learning were struggling to es
tablish its position in the universities. Italy, in spite of the fact that Erasmus
had always longed to visit it, had contained some disappointments when viewed
at first hand. Erasmus was disturbed at the moral tone of some of the Italian
humanists and he had been shocked by the political program and ambitions of
the papacy under Julius II. England could be represented as having acquired
through its students the best that Italy had to offer. Accordingly he decided to
go, but, many years later, he recalled in a letter written to an Italian friend the
memory of one of the last days he spent in Rome.
He had gone to pay a call on the Venetian Cardinal, Domenico Grimani,
at the Palazzo Venezia, and, in spite of the years that had elapsed, the mem
ory of the scene still comes back to him in 1531. The vividness of the details
recalled so long afterwards shows how deeply the event had impressed itself on
Erasmus' mind. It was in the afternoon, the period of the Roman siesta, when
Erasmus came to the great palace built by Paul II which still stands today look
ing much as it did when Erasmus saw it. He describes how he left his horse
with a servant in the court and, finding nobody about, mounted the stairs alone
and proceeded through a series of anterooms until he came to a reception room
in which there was a Greek doctor who was in the cardinal s employ. When
Erasmus learned from the latter that the cardinal was engaged with friends, he
said he would go away and return another time. The doctor, however, inquired
his name and insisted on announcing him to the cardinal, who caused him Lo be
admitted immediately and received him with the greatest honor and cordiality.
Even in retrospect Erasmus seems overwhelmed with awe at the treatment he
was accorded—he, a man of such little account, and Grimani such a great cardi
nal! Here we see an example of that exaggerated respect for constituted auth
ority which was one of the characteristics of Erasmus' style. On this occasion,
however, Erasmus soon lost his self-consciousness in eager discussion with the
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cardinal on his library which was composed of books in many languages. A
cordial conversation followed and the cardinal pressingly invited Erasmus to
stay in Rome and enter his service and that of the church. Writing to his friend
many years later, Erasmus declared, "If I had happened to know this man earli
er, I would never have left the city, since I found him well-disposed to me so
far beyond my merits. But I had already determined on going and things had
advanced so far that I could hardly have stayed with any integrity. When I
had explained that I had been invited by the king of England he ceased to urge
me and only prayed me earnestly to believe that what he had promised had
come from his heart and that I should not think of him as I did of the crowds
of courtiers. He made me promise that I would come to see him again before I
left the city. Unhappily I did not return for fear I would change my mind be
cause of the charm the man exerted."8
It may well be that we cannot entirely trust Erasmus' account of this con
versation written as it was more than twenty years after the event. Certainly if
Erasmus represented to the cardinal that the invitation from England had come
directly from the new king he was not entirely ingenuous in doing so. Never
theless it appears clear that the cardinal did press him to stay in Rome and
opened vistas of opportunities before him. It is equally clear that Erasmus re
fused and that in 1531 in the disillusionment of old age and the disturbed
times he expressed regret for not having accepted the invitation.
One of the most eminent of modern students of Erasmus has remarked
that the date of Erasmus departure from Rome must be regarded as a fateful
day in the history of western culture.9 Had Erasmus remained we can hardly
doubt that he would have risen to an important position in the Roman curia.
He might very probably have been among those who decided the fate of Luther
in 1520 and 1521. And if the case against Luther had been delegated to Eras
mus instead of to a Prierias, who can say whether he would not have urged
upon Leo X a course of moderation so that the religious revolution might not
ave ta 'en place at all or, at the very least, followed a course very different
rom that which actually did take place. Put this way, it is almost as if Erasmus
made a great refusal" and turned his face at a critical moment against putting
his talents at the service of the church. But however fascinating it may be to
explore this historical "if," it is difficult to believe that Erasmus faced actually
in 1509 any issues involving the obligation of the scholar to service in church
or state Neither the invitation from Cardinal Grimani nor the invitation from
in TT 0f a ServiCe t0 SOciety- Erasmus wanted freedom
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ry VIII had earlier been interested in Erasmus and afterwards rewarded him
with a purse, Erasmus did not in 1509 return specifically to the service of the
English crown. He was still in this period pursuing the ideals that had brought
him out of the monastery without finding in his studies any conflict with society
or any sense that he ought to put his talents at the disposal of any particular
authority. Undoubtedly he was confident that the great work he had under
taken would benefit society as a whole, but perhaps for this very reason he was
unwilling to make a commitment to any institution, even the church which
might claim to be the most representative of the interests of the whole Chris
tian society. For Erasmus at this stage the scholar could and indeed must fulfil
his task in the world as opposed to living in a cloister, but without entangling
allegiances.
The next episode in Erasmus' career which I should like to discuss falls
almost exactly ten years later, namely, in the spring of 1519. By now Erasmus
had become the dominating figure in European letters. The Adages had gone
through many editions and had become the most commonly used manual of
quotations from Greek and Latin literature. The Praise of Folly was read and
enjoyed by all not only for its satire against the church, against abuses in the
monastic orders and against the scholastic philosophy, but also for its deep in
sights into the behaviour of every social class. Above all the great edition of
the New Testament in 1516 had established Erasmus as the foremost scholar of
his generation. In the history of European literature perhaps only Voltaire can
be said to have enjoyed a comparable reputation. Erasmus had correspondents
and devoted friends in every country from Poland to Spain and from the Scan
dinavian peninsula to Rome. Men everywhere looked to him for leadership and
an indication of the position that should be taken in the crisis that had been
precipitated by Luther's protest and the debates that followed from it.
In this spring of 1519 the fate of Luther and the question whether his
doctrine was to be condemned were subjects that commanded the attention of
the whole learned world. The Leipzig debate had already made clear some of
the implications of Luther's position, and, although he had not yet written the
great treatises which were to follow in 1520, the original theses had already
been condemned by several authorities and Luther had been invited to come to
Rome to retract. Erasmus was widely regarded as having played a large part
in the inspiration of Luther and was himself at this moment under attack for
orthodoxy by the faculty of theology of the University of Louvain. In these
circumstances Erasmus wrote a letter to the Elector Frederick the Wise urging
him to take Luther under his protection.10
In this letter he states that he does not know Luther personally and he also
says—not quite ingenuously—that he has only dipped into Luther s w ritings.
Be cannot therefore be suspected of favoring a friend. Yet he points out
10
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the Elector that everyone knows the purity of Luther's life and the fact that
Luther cannot be suspected of avarice or self-interest. He had taken up his posi
tion because of a genuine zeal for the Christian faith. Whoever, says Erasmus,
accuses another of heresy ought himself to show morals worthy of a Christian—
candor in judgment, charity in admonition, gentleness in correction, leniency in
giving sentence. "I write these things the more freely as the judgment in the
Lutheran case does not pertain to me. However as it is the part of your High
ness to protect the Christian religion by your piety, so it is the part of your
prudence to see that no innocent man in your jurisdiction be given up to im
piety of others under the pretext of piety. This is the wish of Pope Leo him
self to whom nothing is more important than that innocence be protected. What
they
those at the court of Rome} think of Luther I do not know, although
certainly I see that his books are eagerly read by the best people, although I
have not myself had the time to finish them."11
This letter was followed shortly by another written to the Archbishop of
Mainz. Here also Erasmus urged that the innocent must not be persecuted and
he asserted again the purity of Luther's intention against the motives of many
of those who presumed to judge him. He urged the Archbishop to stay his
hand and refrain from any step that would be irrevocable.12
These letters must be taken to represent a decisive intervention at a critical
moment in the history of the Reformation. We cannot know all the motives
that inspired the Elector Frederick to take Luther under his protection after the
Diet of Worms in 1521, but surely one of the considerations he must have felt
most strongly was the fact that the greatest scholar of his generation had advised
caution. Frederick must have felt the force of arguments advanced by a man
he so much admired. In spite of the hesitations and timidities which we can
find in this letter it remains true that Erasmus spoke out clearly when he had a
most obvious interest to remain silent because of his own situation. Here is a
case where Erasmus, though speaking in the language and style of the scholar,
nevertheless feels that his conscience is touched and that he has a duty to speak
out. All his subsequent hedgings and the ambiguities of his advice cannot ob
literate the fact that in these epistles Erasmus had a perhaps decisive influence
on the course of the Reformation. The scholar had entered the world to take a
morally responsible position.
The third episode I should like to mention occurs eight years later in 1527.
Erasmus was by now disillusioned with Luther and the course of the Reforma
tion. He had written against Luther on the freedom of the will and subse
quently become involved in the continuing polemic with the reformers on this
subject. In choosing to attack Luther on free will he had chosen a subject
whichwas at the heart of the humanist tradition. Surveying the long history of
11

12

1b i d .

Allen, 1033.

34

the controversy on the part played by the human will in collaboration with the
divine will in the process of salvation Erasmus chose to emphasize human po
tentiality. His work was an expression of man's hope rather than a confession
of man's fate and it earned him nothing but opprobrium in the camp of the
reformers. At the same time, however, Erasmus continued to be ill regarded
in the citadels of orthodoxy. His work had been brought under examination
by the ecclesiastical authorities in Spain who considered that he had embarked
upon a dangerous course in his edition of the New Testament and who also
questioned his attitude towards monasticism and towards the sacraments.
During the period of the examination of his works by the Spanish authori
ties, Erasmus received a letter from the Imperial Chancellor, Gattinara. The
latter wrote on March 12, 1527, announcing that he had found a manuscript
of Dante's De Monarchia. This work had been composed by Dante in the early
years of the fourteenth century when Henry VII invaded Italy. The treatise had
never been published and Gattinara now wrote to Erasmus to suggest that the
subject and title were such as to make it relevant to the imperial cause in the
sixteenth century.13
Dante's argument was a justification of universal monarchy. He declared
that human possibilities could only be realized under conditions of peace, but
peace could only be imposed through an Empire. There was a hierarchy of the
forms of political life, extending from the individual to the family to the city
state and to the nation, but these forms were a product of the natural man and
were under the law of nature. A universal empire, however, was made necessary
by the fall and man's sinful condition. It was established under the law of God
to bring the natural man to a state of greater perfection. Historically, Dante's
argument ran, the Romans had rightfully possessed the Empire, and further
more, it was directly a product of divine institution by God.
Gattinara hoped that the publication of this work by Erasmus would serve
the cause of Charles V in a year when his struggle with the Papacy was becom
ing most intense. This was the period of the most serious opposition between
Charles V and Clement VII, an opposition which ended in the terrible sack of
Rome. The action by the Chancellor was perhaps not intended only to support
the imperial propaganda, but also to bolster the reputation of Erasmus at a
moment when he was being attacked by the Spanish monks. Such a request
from the Imperial Chancellor was a mark of confidence that could hardly be
disregarded even by the most reactionary ecclesiastical authority.
Erasmus, however, did not take up this offer. In the conclusion of his
letter the Chancellor had said, "It will be your decision to publish or suppress
this treatise," and Erasmus evidently decided on the latter course for there is
no other mention in his correspondence of the De Monarchia and editto prin13
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ceps did not appear until after Erasmus' death, when it was printed in a collec
tion of treatises on the empire by Oporinus at Basel in 1559-14 We may take
this as yet another example of Erasmus' determination to remain above the
battle and not commit himself to the support of any political program, no mat
ter how urgent were the requests addressed to him and how great the benefits
he might have derived from acceptance.
In the same year in which Erasmus refused Gattinara's request to publish
the De Monarchia he wrote a letter defending himself against certain charges
made against him in Spain. One of these charges takes us back to the visit to
Rome in 1509. It will be remembered that Erasmus had come to Rome in that
year in the company of his pupil Alexander Stuart, illegitimate son of King
James IV of Scotland. The pupil was recalled to Scotland by his father and
before leaving wished to bestow on his teacher some mark of appreciation as a
parting gift. He therefore presented to Erasmus some antique gems among
which was a ring on which there was an engraving of the Roman boundary
god, Terminus, with the motto "concedo nulli"—I yield to none. The device
and the motto pleased Erasmus who adopted them as his own.15
From this time onward Erasmus used this device as a seal. In 1519 Quentin Metsys made a medal at Antwerp with the head of Erasmus and on the re
verse, a representation of Terminus with the motto. Erasmus distributed casts of
this to various friends and patrons.16 In 1524 the cast of this medal was sent to
Nurnberg to have further reproductions made and the Terminus was changed
from a full-face to a profile because of the difficulties of casting which were the
subject of lengthy discussion between Erasmus and his friend Pirckheimer.17
Holbein had done an engraving of the god and the motto for his friend and
a wood cut portrait in which Erasmus is represented holding the statue of Term
inus.18 Erasmus was in the habit of using this device as a signature and for the
authentication of legal documents. On February 28, 1535, when his right hand
was so crippled that he could not hold the pen, he signed in this way a dictated
letter to a Polish bishop.19 He affixed this seal to a donation of 1600 florins as
a trust which he delivered to Boniface Amerbach and he used it also on his
wills.*6 To his friends as well as to his enemies this was therefore a familiar
symbol intimately identified with Erasmus.
Now however in 1527 his Spanish friend Alfonso Valdes wrote that peop e were saying that the motto, I yield to none," showed intolerable arrogance
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on the part of Erasmus and Valdes begged for an explanation which might
silence these criticisms.21
Erasmus replied22 that he was astonished that anyone should have accused
him of arrogance. Those who knew him well would agree that he was the most
humble of men and more accurately described by the motto of Socrates, "I know
this one thing—that I know nothing," than by the device "I yield to none."
However, entirely apart from its applicability, those who imagine that Erasmus
adopted the latter motto for himself are ignorant and foolish. If they knew
Roman history and Roman literature they would recognize the passage in Livy
in which there is a description of the Roman boundary god. This Terminus
represented a sacred limit which was not to be passed and at the remote time
when the precincts of the Capitoline were being prepared for the enclosure of
the temple of Jupiter, Terminus alone of the gods refused to yield to Jupiter
and so came by his motto. It is Terminus himself who says, "I yield to none,"
and it is as ridiculous to suppose that Erasmus intended these words to be con
sidered as spoken by himself as it would be if he had adopted the seal of a
roaring lion with the legend,"Flee from me unless you wish to be eaten."
Would anyone then suppose, says Erasmus to his friend, that the words were
spoken by Erasmus rather than the lion? Thus it is Terminus and not Erasmus
who speaks. Erasmus further explains that when the jewel first came into his
possession he was taken with the artistry and the obscurity of the symbol and
already then, since he seemed to himself far advanced on the road of life, Term
inus came to stand for the boundary of life, that is, the end of life which no
man could escape. In reality then, it is death who speaks and the motto, far
from being an over-confident assertion of man's capacities, is to be taken as a
confession of man's fate. It is a symbol not of what man may accomplish but
of the necessary limits which are set to all accomplishment.
These protestations did not convince Erasmus' enemies at the time23 nor
have they convinced all modern students. Professor Wind has advanced the
theory that Erasmus believed one thing in 1509 when he adopted the device in
a period of great self-confidence and hope, and another thing in 1528 when
the Reformation had already existed for ten years and the hopes of the earlier
period had faded into disillusionment.24
In addition to the evidence cited by Wind for the earlier period there are
some indications that his friends continued throughout his life and to the very
end to take the motto as spoken by Erasmus himself rather than Terminus. In
a letter to his great friend Zasius written in 1523 Erasmus complained that Zasius in the past had sometimes joked about the motto.25 And in the last year of
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Erasmus' life, Paul Volz writing to condole with him on the attacks of Etienne
Dolet said, "You with your Terminus will yield to none," showing that the
motto was still taken by some of Erasmus' friends as a gesture of defiance.26
The ambiguities which have surrounded the interpretation of this motto
can in fact be applied to the consideration of decisions in the life of Erasmus.
We have seen that he did not yield to the temptations offered him by Cardinal
Grimani in Rome and he afterward, throughout his life, resisted many similar
invitations. Neither did he yield to the Chancellor's pressure to give his aid to
the political program of Charles V, though he was the greatest propagandist for
the efforts of the Emperor to bring peace to the European world. On the other
hand, he did yield to the claims of his conscience and intervened against his
own interest to protect from persecution a man whom he considered to be inno
cent.
These incidents may perhaps hardly be taken as altogether representative.
1et they define the boundaries of his compromises. Erasmus has too often been
represented as a craven neurotic who for his own safety was afraid to take sides,
a man who stood above the battle and adopted a variety of subterfuges to en
sure that he should not be involved in it. He was undoubtedly not the stuff
of which either revolutionaries or martyrs are made and yet we can trace in his
life and thought an adherence to certain ideals with which he never compro
mised. I should like to suggest that the contribution of Erasmus to one strand
of that liberal tradition in honor of which these lectures were established was
very great. In an age when commitment is increasingly admired, it has been
fashionable to deplore the uncommitted scholar as the man who stands aside
from the significant battles in which his generation is engaged. But, in fact, at
all times in the history of western thought the world has profited and the liber
al tradition has been guided by men who tried to take a balanced view, who
tried to defend the center when opposition between the extremes was becoming
polarized.
The last stage of Erasmus life has a kind of symbolic value, defining his
position in respect to the religious battles of his life-time. The Reformation
had taken a violent form in Basel in 1529 when the people attacked the catheral and destroyed the images. Catholic worship was prohibited and the forms
approved by Oecolampadius and the town council were instituted. In these cir
cumstances Erasmus realized that he could not continue in Basel in spite of his
many friends there without compromising his position in the eyes of the Catho
lic world. Hence he removed to Freiburg in Breisgau where he found a hospita e we come. In his departure from Basel he was ceremoniously accompa
nied by the town fathers who gave him their regrets at his departure and their
well-wishes for the future. After six years residence in Freiburg he returned to
Basel, being forced to leave Freiburg for his health and hoping to find a refuge
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in Burgundy where he was attracted by the wine which he always preferred
and which he regarded as necessary for his health. Although he had intended
only to pass through Basel to see his old friends and to supervise the printing
of the Origen which was under way at Froben's establishment, he found that
the atmosphere was much the same as he had always known, and as his health
progressively deteriorated, Basel became, without any preparatory decision that
it should be so, his last residence. He wrote to friends that he did not wish to
die in a city which was officially heretical, but he also wrote that he was not
molested by those of differing beliefs.27 And he so far considered the possibility
of his death in Basel that he caused his last will to be authenticated by the
magistrates of Basel as well as by the emperor and the pope, a precaution which
was necessary because of his illegitimate birth and the likelihood that this would
be a source of legal complications unless every contingency had been provided
for in advance. His greatest friends and chosen executors were resident in
Basel as was his principal heir, Boniface Amerbach. He died in July of 1536
before he had been a resident in Basel for an entire year. Boniface Amerbach
has a brief description of his funeral in the letter to John Paumgartner dated
February 1, 1537.28 He describes how Erasmus' body was borne to the cathedral
on the shoulders of the students of the university and attended by all the pro
fessors. When his monument was erected with the inscription which can still
be read celebrating his learning and virtue to posterity, Amerbach caused the
Terminus to be represented upon it.
Thus was buried in a Protestant city and by a Protestant minister this
Catholic whose works were to be condemned by the Council of Trent, this rev
olutionary who had now become a conservative. His funeral and his monument
in Basel Cathedral are a fitting expression of some of the values for which
Erasmus had pleaded throughout a long lifetime. This grave of a Catholic
scholar in a Protestant church with the ambiguities of the classical figure of
Terminus may stand as a kind of symbol for the fact that Erasmus himself had
not yielded either to political advantage or to the extremes of either side, and
thaat he stood for that toleration which was aferwards conspicuously realized in
the city and the country in which he died and even more comprehensively in
the liberal tradition of the whole western world.

Delivered November 6, 1957

27
28

Allen, 3122, 3130.
Allen, 3141.

39

